bosnia report
No. 13 January - 1996
 
II. Military Provisions
by Signed in Paris on 14 December 1995

II. Military Provisions
(Annex 1-A and Annex 1-B)

Obligations of the Parties (Annex 1-A)

The Parties (here, the RBH, FBH and RS), are to comply with the cease-fire arrangements of a 5 October 1995, and refrain from all offensive military actions, including any projection of forces or fire forward of the Parties' own lines, or threats of such actions. The Parties are to cease the firing of all weapons and explosive devices except as authorized by the Accords or IFOR. No military air traffic is to use BH airspace without IFOR authorization. Under 'no circumstances' are the armed forces of either Entity to enter or remain in the territory of the other without the authorization of the latter and the BH Presidency. Neither Party is to take action in retaliation for, or in response to, a violation of Annex 1-A. All armed forces in BH are to 'operate consistently with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.' However, the Accords do not specify how actions are to be deemed inconsistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BH, nor do they provide mechanisms for enforcement or sanctions for non-compliance.

The commands of units of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ABH), the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) within 10 kilometres (km) of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line and inter-Entity boundaries are to co-locate with IFOR commands as determined by IFOR. No military weapons or explosives are to enter or remain within the ZS without IFOR authorization. No forces or heavy weapons are to remain or be deployed within 2 km of the two interim routes between Gorazde and Sarajevo specified byÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ´ the Accords while a new two-lane, all-weather road link called for in the Accords is constructed. Military forces are only to utilize these routes with IFOR authorization and under IFOR management.

The Parties are to cooperate with, and provide unrestricted access to, international personnel performing functions related to the implementation of the Accords. Immediately upon establishment of the Joint Military Commission (see subsection below), each Party is to provide the Commission with information on the positions and descriptions of all known explosives and other physical and military obstacles and hazards in BH. Each Party is to keep the Commission updated on changes in this information. In addition, the armed forces of the Parties are to comply with the following schedule 7 :

By the end of 3 days after the signing of the Accords:

  • Shut down all air defence systems and not re-activate them unless authorized by IFOR.

By the end of 7 days after the Transfer of Authority:

  • Vacate selected positions along the Sarajevo Agreed Cease-Fire Lines as instructed by IFOR.

By the end of 21 days after the signing of the Accords:

  • Provide the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the other Parties, the JMC and the High Representative 8 complete lists of all military and civilian prisoners held in relation to the conflict.

By the end of 30 days after the signing of the Accords:

  • Forces and personnel not of local origin, regardless of their relationship to the Parties, are to withdraw from BH with their equipment.
  • Withdraw all forces to their designated side of the ZS, which is to extend approximately two km to either side of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line. In Sarajevo, the ZS is to extend approximately one km to either side of the Line, but may be adjusted by IFOR.
  • Remove or destroy all mines, ordnance, explosives, and barbed wire from the ZS and areas from which forces are withdrawn or as otherwise required by IFOR, unless the deadline is extended by IFOR.
  • Mark the position of all mines, ordnance, and explosives within BH. In addition to other information requested by IFOR, provide the JMC with comprehensive information on forces, weapons, mines, ordnance, explosives, military infrastructure, and barriers that are within 10km of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line and inter-Entity boundaries; air defence weapons and all associated systems throughout BH; and mines, ordnance, explosives, weapons and all other military equipment throughout BH that cannot be destroyed or dismantled. The Parties are to keep the Commission updated on changes in this information.
  • Release and transfer - according to such a plan as may be developed by the ICRC - all military prisoners and civilians held in relation to the conflict.

By the end of 45 days after the Transfer of Authority:

  • Vacate and clear territory where Entity boundaries do not correspond with the ZS. After 90 days after the Transfer of Authority, or later as determined by IFOR, an Entity's forces may occupy territories transferred to that Entity. After the occupation has occurred, IFOR is to establish a new ZS to correspond with the inter-Entity boundaries.

By the end of 120 days after the Transfer of Authority:

  • Withdraw all heavy weapons and forces to locations designated by IFOR. Demobilize forces that cannot be accommodated in these locations.
  • In addition to other information requested by IFOR, provide the JMC with comprehensive information on forces, weapons military infrastructure and barriers throughout the whole of BH. The Parties are to keep the Commission updated on changes in this information.

Powers and Responsibilities of the Implementation Force (IFOR) (Annex 1-A)

The UN Security Council is to aÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ´uthorize the creation of IFOR under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 9. NATO is to establish IFOR under the direction and political control o the North Atlantic Council (NAC) through the NATO chain of command. NATO is to determine the role of non-aligned states in the force. IFOR is to replace the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). IFOR is to establish and chair a Joint Military Council (JMC) to facilitate the implementation of the military provisions of the Accords and liaise with the Parties (see subsections above) in matters o complaints and questions requiring resolution by IFOR. The Commission is to include the IFOR Commander or his or her representative, the senior military commander of the forces of each Party, up to two civilian representatives selected by each Party, the High Representative an other persons as determined by IFOR. The Commission is to serve primarily as a consultative body for the IFOR commander, who is to have final authority on all military matters.

Aside from supervising the selective marking of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line and the ZS delineated by the Accords, IFOR is not obliged to take any particular action, including deploying along BH's international borders. Instead, it is authorized to take a wide range of actions at its own discretion 10.

IFOR is authorized but not obliged to :

  • use necessary force against the armed forces of any Party that violates military provisions of the Accords.
  • use necessary force if a Party fails to cease activity determined by IFOR to constitute a real or potential threat to itself or another Party, or falls to relocate any force or weapons in BH as requested, or interferes with an attempt by IFOR to 'observe, monitor and inspect' any facility or activity deemed by IFOR to be 'military' in nature 11.
  • deploy anywhere in BH and assist in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and UN Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) forces 12.
  • provide security, 30 days after the Transfer of Authority, in territories to be transferred between the Entities until the introduction of forces of the receiving Entity (see above).
  • manage civilian traffic and military traffic authorized by IFOR between Sarajevo and Gorazde, as well as civilian traffic and military air traffic authorized by IFOR over BH;
  • facilitate conditions for international personnel to conduct any task associated with the Accords; and
  • observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilians and 'respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person'.

While the Accords call for the construction of the new road link from Gorazde to Sarajevo (see above), they do not explicitly charge IFOR with its construction 13. The two existing routes designated in the Accords are to be used in the interim.

IFOR is not specifically charged with any duties related to the UN War Crimes Tribunal.

Arms Control Provisions (Annex 1-B)

The Parties (here, the RBH, FBH, RS, Croatia and FRY) are not to import any arms for 90 days after the signing of the Accords, and are not to import heavy weapons, ammunition for such weapons, mines, military aircraft and helicopters for 180 days after the signing of the Accords, or until an arms control agreement takes effect, whichever is the earlier.

Within seven days of the signing of the Accords, the Parties are to commence negotiations under the auspices of OSCE to agree upon 'a series of measures to enhance mutual confidence and reduce the risk of conflict,' including restrictions on military deployments and movements, reintroduction of foreign forces, identification and monitoring of weapons production capabilities and the exchange of various types of military information. The objective of these negotiations is to conclude an agreement within 45 days of the signing of the Accords. The AccordÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ´s to not specify what is to occur if any such agreement is not reached.

Within 30 days of the signing of the Accords, the Parties are to commence negotiations under the auspices of OSCE on an agreement to establish numerical limits on holding of tanks, artillery, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters 14. 'Artillery pieces' are to be defined as those of 75mm calibre and above. Also, within 30 days of the signing of the Accords, the Parties are to report their holdings in these categories. The holdings of the FRY are to be the 'baseline' for numerical limits.

If the Parties fail to reach such an agreement within 180 days of the signing of the Accords, the following limits on holdings in these categories are to apply, according to the ratio of 5:2:2 for the FRY, Croatia and BH respectively:

  • the limits of the FRY are to be 75% of the baseline;
  • the limits of BH are to be 30% of the baseline;
  • the allocations for BH are to be divided between the FBH and the RS according to a ratio of 2:1 respectively.

The OSCE is to assist the Parties in the implementation and verification of resulting agreements. However, the Accords do not specify the nature or extent of the OSCE's authority in, or mechanisms for, such assistance The Accords also do not provide for the enforcement of resulting agreements.

Marshall Freeman Harris & Stephen Walker
The Balkan Institute, Washinton · 22 December 1995

Footnotes

  1. Unless otherwise indicated, all schedules and deadlines included in this paper refer to the date of the signing of the Accords (14 December 1995). Where specifically indicated, certain military schedules and deadlines refer to the date of Transfer of Authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR (20 December 1995).
  2. Annex 10 of the Accords provided that a 'High representative' (HR) is to be appointed consistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions to facilitate and coordinate the implementation of non-military provisions of the Accords. The HR is to, inter alia, monitor the implementation of the Accords, coordinate the activities of non-military agencies and organizations to ensure the efficient implementation of non-military provisions of the Accords, and report periodically on progress in implementation of the Accords to the UN, the European Union (EU), USA, Russia and 'other interested governments, parties and organizations'. The HR is to respect the autonomy of these agencies and organizations within their spheres of operation 'while as necessary giving general guidance'.
    On 8-9 December 1995 representatives of more than fifty states and international organizations met in London to plan for implementation of the non-military provisions of the Accords. Conference participants appointed UN mediator for the former Yugoslavia and former Swedish prime minister Karl Bildt as HR.
  3. UN Security Council Resolution 1031 (5 December 1995) authorized IFOR to replace UNPROFOR in Bosnia. The transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR occurred on 20 December 1995. While anticipating that the IFOR occurred on 20 December 1995. While anticipating that the IFOR mission will last one year, the resolution provides for the extension of its mandate. It authorizes, but does not oblige, UN member states to take 'all necessary measures' to assist IFOR in carrying out its mission. Upon transfer of UNPROFOR authority to IFOR, the Security Council's 'safe areas' resolutions, as well as all other previous resolutions authorising the use of force in the RBH, were terminated. The resolution does not assign IFOR specific duties related to the UN War Crimes Tribunal.
  4. The NAC may establish additional duties and responsibilities for IFOR. ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ´
  5. Roadblocks, checkpoints or other impediments to IFOR freedom of movement would constitute a violation of the Accords and be cause for necessary military action by IFOR.
  6. The UNCRO mandate is scheduled to expire on 15 January 1996. The UNPROFOR mandate terminated with the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR (20 December 1995), It was previously due to expire on 31 January 1996.
  7. Unlike existing routes between Gorazde and Sarajevo, the new road is to lie entirely in FBH territory. (See 'Territorial Provisions' below).
  8. Also, within 30 days of the signing of the Accords, the Parties are to commence negotiations on an agreement establishing voluntary limits on military manpower. The Accords do not set a deadline for concluding these negotiations.

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