Further Agreed Basic Principles
(additional to those issued 8 September 1995 in Geneva)
4. Each of the two entities will honour the international obligations of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so long as the obligation is not a financial obligation incurred by one entity without the consent of the other.
5. It is the goal that free democratic elections be held in both entities as soon as social conditions permit. In order to maximize the democratic effectiveness of such elections, the following steps will be taken by both entities.
5.1. Both governments will immediately pledge their full support, starting immediately, for a) freedom of movement, (b) the right of displaced persons to repossess property or receive just compensation, (c) freedom of speech and of the press, and (d) protection of all other internationally recognized human rights in order to enhance and empower the democratic election process.
5.2. As soon as possible the OSCE (or other international organisation) will station representatives in all principal towns throughout the Federation and Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina and publish monthly reports as to the degree to which (a) the obligations listed in all of the Agreed Basic Principles have been fulfilled, and (b) social conditions are being restored to a level at which the election process may be effective.
5.3. Within 30 days after the OSCE delegations have concluded that free and democratic elections can be properly held in both entities, the governments of the two entities will conduct free and democratic elections and will fully cooperate with an international monitoring programme.
6. Following the elections, the affairs and prerogatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be vested in the following institutions, in accordance with all of the Agreed Basic Principles.
6.1. A parliament or assembly, two-thirds of which will be elected from the territory of the Federation, and one-third from the territory of the Republika Srpska. All parliamentary actions will be by majority vote provided that the majority includes at least one-third of the votes from each entity.
6.2. A Presidency, two thirds of which will be elected from the territory of the Federation, and one-third from the territory of the Republika Srpska. All Presidency decisions will be taken by majority vote, provided, however, that if one-third or more of the members disagree with a decision taken by the other members and declare the decision to be destructive of a vital interest of the entity or entities from which the dissenting members were elected, the matter will be referred immediately to the appropriate entity/entities parliament. If any such parliament confirm the dissenting position by a two-thirds vote, then the challenged decision will not take effect.
6.3. A cabinet of such ministers as may be appropriate.
6.4. A Constitutional Court with jurisdiction to decide all questions arising under the Constitution of Bosnia- Herzegovina as it will be revised in accordance with all of the Agreed Basic Principles.
6.5. The parties will negotiate in the immediate future as to further aspects of the management and operation of these institutions.
6.6. The foregoing institutions will have the responsibility for the foreign policy of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The parties will negotiate further to determine the extent to which these institutions will also have responsibility for other matters consistent with all of the Agreed Basic Principles.
The attached Basic Principles have been agred upon today by Muhamed Sacirbey, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina, Mate Granic, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Croatia, and Milan Milutinovic, Foreign Minister of the 'Federal Republic of Yugoslavia', and witnessed by Representatives of France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, and by the European Union Special Negotiator for the Former Yugoslavia.
New York, 26 September 1995
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Further Unprincipled Principles
by
Marshall Harris and Steven Walker
- The Further Agreed Basic Principles, if implemented, would complete the legal dissolution of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its constitution by replacing them with a new state with two entities, two new constitutions, a new presidency, a new parliament, and a new constitutional court.
- Article 4 creates de facto recognition of Republika Srpska as a state by requiring it, along with the Bosnian Federation entity, to honour the international obligations of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Only states may be obligated by international commitments. If Bosnia's sovereignty is to be preserved, this article would make the federal entity responsible for ensuring that Bosnia-Herzegovina's international obligations were carried out within the two sub- entities.
- The failure of the Further Agreed Basic Principles to provide for Bosnia's defense and protection and maintenance of its borders makes integration of the two entities de facto meaningless since these functions are essential to a unitary state. International military assistance to Bosnia would likely not be forthcoming unless there were provision for Bosnia's defense and clear lines of military authority.
- The Republika Srpska is given full presidential and parliamentary veto power (under articles 6.1 and 6.2) over the Federation, which is ostensibly the dominant entity in the new Bosnia. This is a recipe for paralysis and the wielding of disproportionate power by the Republika Srpska.
A strong veto authority exists in the new presidency and parliament, which can be expected to be the scene of intense conflict in the new government of Bosnia. While free and fair elections can be expected to produce democratic presidency members from the Federation, it is highly likely that - in the absence of democratic rule and, concomitantly, in the continuing atmosphere of a military or police state - the Republika Srpska representatives would vote as a block.
- With its broad mandate to decide 'all questions arising under the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina', the constitutional court
(under article 6.4) could easily have greater powers than the presidency and parliament.
- By buying into the fundamental illogic of rewarding aggression and ethnic separation, the US negotiators are promoting a carve-up that is not only unjust and undemocratic, but also inconsistent in its various percentage formulae.
First, the Republika Srpska is being given a percentage of territory that is, by any known accounting, disproportionate to its population. Forty-nine percent of Bosnia's territory is ceded to the Bosnian Serb forces, but less than one million Bosnian Serbs are loyal to (or are forced to be loyal to) the Pale regime. Indeed, by some calculations, only 500,000 Bosnian Serbs now reside in Serb-controlled territory. Even if the one million figure is used, one-quarter of Bosnia's pre-war population of 4.4 million is to be given one-half of its territory.
More troubling, the Bosnian Serb forces are being given disproportionate representation in the central government (under articles 6.1 and 6.2). Again, even if every ethnic Serb refugee from Bosnia returns to the Republika Srpska, its electorate would constitute only one quarter of Bosnia's total population. Yet the Republika Srpska is given a one-third voice - or, with the above-mentioned veto powers, an equal or even majority voice -in the central government.
The Republika Srpska's one-third voice in the new Bosnia would be consistent as a percentage formula only if the Western military enforcers of the new agreement intend to purge the Federation of its ethnic Serbs (an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 persons) and resettle them in the Republika Srpska. Only then would the Republika Srpska's population constitute one-third of the new Bosnia.
- As with the Geneva agreement, the Further Agreed Basic Principles (under article 5.1) abridge refugees' inalienable rights by allowing for compensation instead of the right to return. Rather than compromising refugees' rights, the Principles should provide fully for refugees' rights to return to their homes and repossess their real estate and other property.
- The Principles increase the role of the UN and NATO (military enforcement of the agreement) and the OSCE (involvement in internal affairs to determine whether elections can take place, etc) in Bosnia, without providing for clear terms for an end to these involvements or a clear path to re-establish Bosnia's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.
- All of these points will likely to be entirely academic since the US initiative does not provide for military arrangements to dislodge the Bosnia Serb forces' hold over Republika Srpska territory. Unless ultra-nationalist control is removed, the constitutional arrangements outlined in the Further Agreed Basic Principles and the Geneva Agreement will most likely never be effected. For example, the Republika Srpska could simply never create 'social conditions' to permit free and democratic elections (article 5).
Necessary items omitted from Further Agreed Basic Principle:
- any mention of the 'Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina';
- any mention of 'free and fair elections';
- provisions for common defense and protection and maintenance of the country's borders; and
- provision for the apprehension and arrest of indicted war criminals.
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