We’ll take vengeance on the Turks
Author: Sonja Biserko
Uploaded: Thursday, 11 May, 2006
Reflection upon the anti-Muslim campaign that, over thirty years, bombarded Serbs with propaganda designed to prepare them psychologically to wage a genocidal war.
2006 will be a decisive year for Serbia, since it seems that the international community has decided finally to settle the crisis created by the break-up of Yugoslavia. The unresolved status of Kosovo and Montenegro has permitted the maintenance of the illusion about the feasibility of the Serb national project, or more precisely its expansionist aspirations. The end of the process also involves, of course, pressure on Serbia to cooperate with The Hague tribunal, including surrendering Ratko Mladić.
The government’s attempt finally to ‘deliver’ Mladić failed once again. The hysteria created in regard to this unleashed another anti-Hague campaign: The Hague once again became ‘a place where one must contest the obdurate lie behind which the true international butchers and criminals hide’. The same mind offers the opinion that ‘luckily the number of those who believe in the black tale of Srebrenica is in decline; it is becoming a burden even for its alleged victims’. It is said that ‘the fabrication about Srebrenica was thought up before the routine liberation of the kasaba [provincial town]’, as was the ‘mass nature’ of the crime: Srebrenica was chosen because it ‘borders Serbia and in order to punish Serbia’. Another argument in the same mode is that the Serb army ‘did not enter a single non-Serb village, except when forced to by reason of self-defence’. Ratko Mladić, however, said on the occasion of the conquest of the village of Osmača that it was ‘a big Muslim village which no Serb had ever entered before we liberated it’.
It is increasingly likely that the status of Kosovo will be resolved with some speed, and that its independence (whether full or conditional) represents the optimal solution. The Serb Radical Party - and before it the Serbian Orthodox Church - proposed that in that eventuality Kosovo should be proclaimed an occupied land. [Radical leader] Tomislav Nikolić and the Serbian prime minister [Vojislav Koštunica] have allegedly agreed on this. Government representatives stress privately that Kosovo’s independence is ‘a given’, which brings a degree of relief to everyone; but publicly they continue to insist that they will not accept such a solution. The media continue their anti-Albanian campaign, some warning that ‘Kosovo independence means the creation of an Islamic terrorist state in Serbia’s belly’. It is also alleged that ‘the Serbs living in their Kosovo ghettoes are preparing for a quick flight’, and that Slobodan Milošević was ‘the first European statesman whose army and police fought bravely against organised terrorism, a militant, brutal and Islamic terrorism that was destroying Christian places of worship and killing Christians’.
The award for the Bosnian film Grbavica came unexpectedly into the focus of Serbian public attention. Its winning of the Golden Bear at the Berlin film festival was received in Belgrade as an award against ‘criminal Serbs’. It is said that the film was not about ‘the rape of women in wars’, but represented ‘anti-Serb propaganda and a renewed fanning of inter-national hatred and besmirching of the Serb people’. Meanwhile the Bosnian lawsuit against Serbia-Montenegro filed with the International Court of Justice in The Hague also caused stormy reactions, with the media focussing on war reparations that will be paid by ‘our children’.
The presentation of the bill for the failed Serb national programme could have been foreseen by every minimally serious analyst of the Balkan situation. So the extent to which the Memorandum Serbs lulled themselves into permanent expectation of another outcome, one that would show retrospectively that they were right, is quite unbelievable. Their moral duty is to lay out their failures before the public, and to accept the responsibility for what has befallen their children’s generation, a generation that will increasingly be confronted with films like Grbavica and other artistic interpretations of the Yugoslav wars.
The sentence spoken by Ratko Mladić on the occasion of the ‘liberation’ of Srebrenica, 11 July 1995 - ‘On the eve of yet another great Serb festive day we offer this town as a gift to the Serb people; the moment has finally arrived, following the rebellion against the dahija [Ottoman tyrant] for us to take our vengeance on the Turks in this area.’ - is a logical outcome of the atmosphere created during the preparation for the war in the Yugoslav area. We are referring to the role which a part of the Serbian intellectual and cultural elite, especially the academicians gathered around the Memorandum, played in the destruction of Yugoslavia.
It is necessary to recall that especially active in this circle were the Serbian Islamicists, whose ‘special task’ was to demonise Yugoslavia’s Muslim population. Because ‘the Muslims were a particularly vulnerable community, due to specific geopolitical conditions, and because their status obstructed the creation of a Great Serbia’. This was of key significance for the policy of their physical extermination and deportation. Well in advance of the start of the war, the writers of the Memorandum began to articulate negative stereotypes about Muslims as a foreign, inferior and dangerous element. A favourite theme was their numerical weight, which threatened to turn the Serb people into a minority in their own land. One of the authors of the Memorandum, the prominent Yugoslav demographer Miloš Macura, argued at a conference on Kosovo held in 1988 that: ‘their demographic aims, which do not differ essentially from those in the past, derive evidently also from contemporary aspirations.’ According to him ‘the pro-Islamic and pro-natality ideology finds a strong support in Islam’, i.e. ‘the pro-natality awareness is supported by [Albanian] tribal/clan heads, by hodže [religious leaders], and by parents, so that behind this profuse and uncontrolled procreation we find the three most important institutions of the traditional society: clan and tribe, Islam as an organised religious community, and family as a significant social institution.’ Miroljub Jeftić also warned that the Muslim world can realise its aim of living ‘in the Balkan area in accordance with the word of Allah’ only when the Muslims have achieved a demographic dominance and with it the strength to realise that aim. According to Jeftić, a religion telling the Muslims that to have as many children as possible was a pious duty was being used to advocate a high birthrate. In his view, the world-wide Islamic planners had the task of Islamicizing all of Serbia as the first step in their thrust into Europe.
In a series of articles that they wrote for daily and weekly publications, as well as for the army paper Vojska, professors Darko